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Spirit Airlines 
SPIRIT AIRLINES: ACHIEVING A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
THROUGH ULTRA-LOW COSTS 
James Elian and Gerald N. Cook 
Abstract 
Large losses between 2004 and 2006 brought Spirit Arrlines to the verge of failure. With capital mfustons 
from two pnvate equity groups and a new cost focus strategy patterned after Europe's Ryanarr, Spirit proclatmed itself 
an ultra-low-cost carrier Spirit usually offers the lowest fare m its markets, but thts base fare buys a seat with 
allowance for under-seat baggage only Everythmg else, mcluding a glass of water, ts extra. Ancillary fees account 
for some 40% of total revenues. Although it has developed a customer base of pnce sensitive travelers, Sptnt ts also 
among the mdustry leaders m complamts. Nonetheless, Spirit should dommate the pnce sensitive U.S. arr travel 
market tn the short to medium term as it has achieved a sustamable competitive advantage based on Porter's cost focus 
strategy. 
Since deregulation ID 1978, the U.S. airline 
1Ddustry bas struggled to achieve consistent profitability. No 
longer protected from competition on profitable routes, 
legacy earners faced 1Dcreased competition from each other 
and, more importantly, from new entrant airlines not 
burdened by ngtd contract work rules and btgh labor costs 
tnherited from the regulated 1Ddustry. The first decade of the 
twenty-first century was particularly difficult for the 
1Ddustry as it was buffeted by successive world events 
1Dcluding the terronst attacks of September 11, 200 I and 
subsequent recession, the severe acute resprratory syndrome 
(SARS) epidemic, the dramatic nse and 1Dcreased volatility 
of oil pnces, and, finally, the global recess10n begtnn1Dg ID 
2008. By 2012, the collective toll resulted ID the bankruptcy 
of all surv1vmg pre-deregulation legacy earners. Thts led to 
airline consolidations and domestic capacity reduction 
resulting ID much needed 1Ddustry stability. While the low-
cost earners (LCCs) have generally continued to expand ID 
the new millenmum, the domestic airline product offered by 
the full-servtce and LCCs has converged to the extent that 
many passengers view the domestic economy class seat as 
a commodity (Tarry, 2010). An 1Dteresting recent 
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development ts the emergence of the so-called ultra-low-
cost carrier (ULCC) bus1Dess model first developed ID 
Europe by Ryanair and more recently IDtroduced ID the U.S. 
by Spirit Airlines. The ULCC bus1Dess model stnves to 
obtatn a competitive advantage through a more aggressive 
implementation of Porter's cost focus strategy compared to 
traditional LCCs. By choos1Dg to focus almost exclusively 
on mm1m1z1Dg costs, the ULCC bus1Dess model results ID a 
very focused target segment of those passengers who are 
concerned solely with obtatntng the lowest pnce for arr 
travel (Porter, 1998). 
Tbts paper ts a case study of Spirit Airlines' 
aggressive implementation of Porter's cost focus strategy to 
transform from a small, struggling low cost airline serv1Dg 
gambling and vacation destinations ID the eastern United 
States to a highly profitable and rapidly growmg ultra-low-
cost earner with routes stretcbtng across the U.S. and south 
to the Canbbean and Central and South Amenca. 
History 
Spirit Airlines traces its onglD to the Clipper 
Trucktng Company established ID 1964. Twenty years later, 
with a new bus1Dess plan and name, Charter One, the 
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company began offenng charter flights and tour packages to 
entertamment destinations, pnmarily from the Midwest to 
Atlantic City, New Jersey. By 1992, Charter One became 
Sprrit Arrlines with scheduled service promoting low fares, 
a strategy densively termed bottom feeding by some due to 
havmg typical attributes of multiple extra charges and poor 
customer service (Flint, 1999). Sprrit grew, pnmarily with 
expanded routes from the Midwest and Northeast to Flonda, 
but it struggled with low and mconsistent profits as it had 
not fully committed to one of Porter's three genenc 
competitive strategies: cost leaderslnp, differentiation, or 
focus (Porter, 1998). Due to Sprrit's lack ofa competitive 
advantage, it mcurred large losses from 2004 to 2006 that 
brought the arrline to the verge of failure; it was rescued 
with capital mfusions m 2004 and 2005 from the pnvate 
equity mvestment firm Oak.tree Capital Management. In 
2006, Indigo Investment Group purchased controlling 
mterest m Sprrit, brought m new management and 
unplemented a busmess plan focused solely on providing 
the lowest pnce targeting a very narrow segment of the air 
travel market. Sprrit thus proclauned itself as an ultra-low-
cost earner (SprritArrlines, 201 la). Although first m North 
Amenca, Sprrit's busmess model was patterned closely on 
the highly successful European earner Ryanarr that had 
itself adopted the strategy after operating for many years on 
a traditional LCC model onginally developed by Southwest 
Arrlines. On June 1"1, 2011, an mitial public offenng (lPO) 
was completed takmg Sprrit Arrlines public (Sprrit Arrlines, 
2012a). The IPO was mitially seen as a disappomtment by 
many analysts; Sprrit reduced the pnce and volume of the 
o:tfenng shortly before listing that resulted m a more than 
thrrty percent reduction m capital raised ("Sprrit Airlines 
IPO," 2011). Figirre 1 illustrates Sprrit's perilous losses 
begmnmg with the recession of2001 and continwng until 
the adoption of the ultra-low-cost strategy. 
Spirit Airlines Net Income (In Thousands) 
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Figure I. SprritArrlines Net Income from 1995 to 2006. Adapted from Department ofTransportation Statistics and SprritArrlines' 
IPO Prospectus (Sprrit Arrlines, 2011 b) 
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A revtew of recent financial and operational data mdicates 
that the ultra-low-cost model has proven remarkably 
successful. In 2012, Spirit was the fastest growmg U.S. 
earner with revenue passenger miles mcreasmg30.6% while 
available seat miles mcreased 27.5% dnvmg its load factor 
to 84.8% (Hegeman, 2013). Moreover, Spirit enjoyed the 
second highest profitability of all U.S. major earners for 
2012 falling Just behmd fellow mche earner Allegtant Atr.1 
Strategy 
Spirit's ultra-low-cost strategy IS remarkably 
sunple m concept and aggressively follows Porter's cost 
focus strategy for achlevmg a competitive advantage. As 
CEO Ben Baldanza often explams, "We're selling low 
pnces, and compete for customers on the bas1S of pnce 
and pnce alone. In the retail world, we would be the 
dollar store." (Satchell, 2013). Tins strategy reqwres a 
very low cost structure, and Spirit has been mnovative by 
unbundling many services which traditionally have been 
considered standard. The result of unbundling has been 
the ability to offer even lower base pnces, while also 
achlevmg ancillacy revenues that compnse 40% of Spirit's 
total revenues, the highest m the mdustcy (Spirit Airlines, 
2012b). Spirit's base pnce is usually the lowest m the 
market, but entitles the passenger to only a seat on the 
flight; all else, mcluding a glass of water, is extra. 
Baldanza argues that these are options that a passenger 
may choose similar to the menu items at McDonalds and 
that passengers should not have to pay for servtces they 
do not need or value. Not all passengers are pleased, but 
the model is workmg leading USA Today to ask if Spirit 
ts the nation's only true low-cost airline? (Jones, 2012). 
Target Market 
Spirit's target market ts narrowly focused on 
leisure and vtsiting mends and relatives (VFR) passenger 
segments. Leisure is the pnmary domestic segment with 
VFR second. Internationally, these segments are reversed 
1 Author's calculation based on operating and net margm on revenue. 
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with VFR first followed by leisure. The product is 
carefully tailored for these pnce-sensitive travelers who 
are willing to sacrifice product amenities for a lower 
pnce. Spirit is disciplined m mamtammg its focused 
market and unlike all other domestic earners except 
Allegtant Arr, does not actively target busmess and 
corporate travelers reasonmg that its low frequency, 
limited routes, reunbursement policy, and lack of airport 
and onboard amenities have very limited appeal to the 
busmess segment so pnzed by other earners (Spirit 
Airlines, 2012a). 
Route Architecture 
The route map is thm but spans the contiguous 
states and stretches south mto the Caribbean and 
Amencas. Spirit lists several airlines as competitors. 
Across its route system, the pnnciple competitor is 
Amencan Airlines with 60% market overlap, followed by 
Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, and Delta Arr Lmes 
domestically, and JetBlue Airways m the Caribbean and 
Latin Amencan markets (Spirit Airlines, 2012a). Spirit 
pndes itself on not bemg subject to the traditional 
meffic1enc1es of the hub and spoke model (Spirit Airlines, 
2012a); however, an exammation of the route map (Figure 
2) and timetable reveals a more complex reality. Ft. 
Lauderdale serves as a directional hub with mommg 
southbound flights from Northeastern and Midwest states 
connecting to many Caribbean, Central and South 
Amencan destinations. Flows are reversed m the 
aftemoon/evenmg. Random connections are also available 
m other cities such as Dallas/Ft. Worth, Chicago and 
Detroit, but some routes stand alone without support of 
connecting traffic. Frequencies are low, often only once 
daily and not timed for peak demand. Spirit also defies the 
archetypal low-cost model by servmg both highly 
congested major airports mcluding Chicago O'Hare, Los 
Angeles International, and New York LaGuardia, among 
others, as well as secondary and low density airports such 
as Latrobe Pennsylvama and Phoemx Mesa. 
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Figure 2. Spirit Airlines Route Network (Spirit Airlines. 2013a). 
Spirit bas recently been growmg its domestic route 
system after several years of developmg mtemational 
markets m the Canbbean, Central and South Amenca. 
Unlike many earners, Spirit JS unconcerned with market 
share when evaluating potential routes (Yeo, 2012). Nor 
does irugor earner competition appear to be an nnportant 
consideration as Spirit bas been mcreasmg destinations and 
departures from Dallas/Ft. Worth where Amencan Airlines 
bas been weakened by bankruptcy but Southwest Airlines JS 
a strong competitor from its Dallas-Love home. For Spuit 
to consider a route for expansion there must be at least 200 
passengers per day each way, the ability to reduce fares by 
at least 25% below existing levels, and the potential to earn 
an EBITDAR 2argm of24% to 26%. With these expansion 
2 Eammgs before mterest, taxes, depreCJation, amortimion and rent. 
Page26 
critena, Spirit enters markets where low pnce stimulates 
demand from new passengers m addition to captmmg some 
of the pnce-sensitive segment from mcumbent earners. 
Spirit mamtams that more than 400 potential routes meeting 
these critena have been identified (Ranson, 2012; Spirit 
Airlines, 2012b). 
Fleet 
Spirit operates the Airbus A320 family of smgle-
aisle Jets. Most are the smaller A319 model, but the autine 
plans to gradually standardi7.C on the larger A320, mcluding 
the next generation A320neo (new engme option). 
Operating a smgle fleet type confers substantial cost 
effic1enc1es mcludingreduced trammg costs and accelerated 
leammg curve, flexibility as crewmembers are qualified on 
all aircraft models, and reduced parts mventory. As of the 
end of 2012, Spirit had 45 aircraft m its fleet, with a 
substantial aircraft order book allowmg for expansion to 113 
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arrcraft by the end of2021 (Sprrit Arrlines, 2013b). 
Product and Fare Structure 
Sprrit's ability to promote low fares IS based, ID 
part, on the ultimate unbundled pnc1Dg strategy. The base 
fare buys a seat with allowance for under-seat baggage only 
(Yeo, 2012). All other amenities IDcluding checked and 
overhead carry-on baggage can be purchased for additional 
fees. Indeed, Sprrit was the IDdustry leader ID chargmg for 
baggage. Table 1 shows a portion of the surpns1Dgly 
complex system of baggage fees. Ancillary fees, of which 
there are 74 different options, also vary with the time and 
location of purchase with the highest fees charged at the 
arrport Just before departure. Figure 3 proVIdes a breakdown 
of Sprrit's ancillary revenues. Amenities are limited and 
there are no passenger lounges or on-board entertamment; 
"pre-reclined" seats are becommg standard and legroom 1s 
mlDlmal. Passengers are expected to mostly handle therr 
own process1Dg. Customer seMce, when needed, 1s often 
rushed. 
Sprrit mmmuzes customer service costs, but this 
has contributed to its very high rate of customer compla1Dts. 
For January, 2013, Sprrit amassed 7.2 complamts per 
100,000 fliers filed with the Department of Transportation, 
better than Frontier with 7 .6 per 100,000 passengers, but 
some 22 times that of Southwest who garnered the best 
performance and more than 2.5 times that of the United 
Arrlines which held the next worst position.3 CEO Baldanza 
1s largely 1Ddifferent pass1Dg off complamts as "an rrrelevant 
statistic" (Miller, 2012). Sprrit believes that passengers will 
repeatedly endure Spartan service ID return for a low fare. 
As one passenger stated ID a Yelp review, "I travel on Sprrit 
all the time. I know they suck! But, for a cheap ticket, I will 
endure anything" (Seaney, 2012). 
3 Authors' calculation. 
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Figure 3. Spuit Airlines Ancillary Revenue. Adapted from Spuit Airlines' Form 10-K for the penod ending 12/31/12 (Spuit 
Airlines, 2013b). 
Table 1 
Spuit Airlines Ancillary Baggage Fees 
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Distribution and Promotion 
Spuitmamtams three distinctdistnbutionchannels. 
The website accounted for 64.2% of ticket sales m 2012. 
Thtrd parties, mcluding Global Distnbution Systems (GDS), 
traditional travel agents and online travel agents (OTA) 
produced 27 .2% of sales, with an outsourced call center 
representing the remammg at 8.6% of sales (Spuit Airlines, 
2013b). 
Although Sp1rit's embrace of traditional 
distribution mcreases its reach and sales, it 1sn 't without 
problems. It distributes through Amadeus, Galileo, 
Worldspan and Sabre GDSs, but the airline reserves its 
lowest fares for its Spuit.com website ("Spuit Airlines, after 
IPO," 2011). When customers use Spuit's website, its 
additional fees and policies are prommently displayed. 
OT As, however, show only the base fare leavmg passengers 
surpnsed and occasionally irate when discovermg what isn't 
mcluded m the base fare. Baldanza attributes 100 percent of 
passengercomplamtstosalesthroughOTAs(Snyder,2013). 
This 1s certamly an overstatement, but illustrates the limited 
ability of third party systems. 
Spuit does not engage m general brand or product 
marketing and spent only 0.2% of revenues on marketing m 
Table2 
Spuit A1rlines 2012 CASM (in cents) versus competitors 
s . •t 
•Pin 
Fuel 
Salanes, wages and benefits 
Aircraft rent 
Landing fees and other rentals 
Mamtenance, matenals and repairs 
Depreciation and amortization 
Other o ..... ~ eXDCDses 
TotalCASM 
Total CASM excluding Fuel 
4.16 
1.93 
1.27 
0.60 
0.44 
0.13 1.56 
10.09 
5.93 
Spirit A 1rlines 
2011 pnmarily emphasmng low base fares. Pnnc1ple 
marketing tools mclude the $9 Fare Club, email distribution, 
and viral marketing products that send customers to the 
Spuit website (Spuit Airlines, 2012a). 
Despite the lack of a substantial advertising budget, 
Spuit 1s well known for edgy, often off-color, advert1smg 
that has generated considerable free publicity, though often 
not positive. Notable are the "Hunt for Hoffa" campaign of 
2006; MILF, Many Islands, Low Fares, m 2007; the "Eye of 
the Tiger'' sale of 2009; and the 2010 "Check Out The Oil 
On Our Beaches" promotion (Bhasm, 2011 ). Email 1s the 
common method of commumcation. 
Cost Structure 
Any firm employmg a cost focus strategy must 
mamtam unit costs lower than its competitors m its target 
segment (Porter, 1998). Spuit states its cost per available 
seat mile (CASM), a standard measure ofairline costs, 
was 10.09 cents m 2012 (Spuit Airlines, 2013b). This 
compares with 12.85 for Southwest, 11.49 at JetBlue, and 
14.91 cents for Amencan A1rlines. Table 2 provides a 
more detailed CASM companson between the listed 
earners. 
So th t u wes 
4.78 
3.69 
0.28 
0.81 
0.88 
0.66 
1.75 
12.85 
8.07 
A mencan 
5.24 
3.76 
0.33 
0.77 
0.68 
0.60 
3.52 
14.91 
9.67 
tBI 1e ue 
4.50 
2.60 
0.33 
0.69 
0.84 
0.65 
1.88 
11.49 
6.99 
(Spuit Airlines, 2013b) (Southwest Airlines, 2013) (Amencan Airlines, 2013) GetBlue, 2013) 
Spuit achieves low unit costs from (a) high aircraft 
utilization, (b) high-density seating aircraft configuration, 
( c) s1mple operations, ( d) mmimal hub-and-spoke 
meffic1enc1es, (e) a highly productive workforce, (t) 
opportunistic outsourcmg of operating functions, (g) 
operating a modern smgle fleet type of aircraft, (h) reduced 
sales and distribution costs, (i) efficient flight schedule with 
JAAER, Fall 2013 
mm1mal ground times between flights, and G) a company-
wtde busmess culture that IS keenly focused on dnvmg costs 
lower (Spuit Airlines, 2013b). 
In a presentation to potential mvestors, Spuit boasted that its 
daily aircraft utilization of 12.7 hours exceeds JetBlue's rate 
of 11.9 hours per day, and Southwest's 10.5 hours per day 
(Spuit, 2012b ). This mcreased aircraft utilization 1s partially 
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aclneved through the operation of many ''red-eye" flights. 
The unbundled pncmg speeds ground tum-around times as 
lngh fees for carry-on baggage reduce the number of bags 
brought on-board which, m turn, enables passengers to 
qwckly stow therr items and take therr seats. As a result, the 
standard boarding times have been reduced by 5 to 10 
mmutes (McCarbtey, 2010). By chargmg for all beverages, 
mcluding water, fewer beverages are consumed. Catermg 
time and expenses are reduced, as ts fuel consumption due 
to the reduced arrcraft operating weight. 
Sprrit configures its cabms with the maximum seats 
allowed by the arrcraft certification. The new A320 arrcraft 
are configured at 178 seats. Tuts compares with JetBlue's 
150 seats for the same Atrbus model g1vmg Sprrit a 16% 
cost advantage per available seat mile. Of course, h1gh-
density seating 1s aclneved through reducmg passenger 
legroom decreasmg passenger comfort. Sprrit also enjoys 
substantially lower labor costs than its competitors. These 
lower costs are partially due to higher employee 
productivity, but are also due to a relatively Junior 
workforce resulting from the recent expansion (Spirit 
Arrlines, 2013b). 
Financial Success 
Since the mtroduct1on of the ultra-low-cost 
earner busmess model m 2007, Sprrit has been 
consistently profitable. Followmg a small profit that year, 
profits mcreased impressively with net mcome of $33 
million m 2008 and between $72 million and $108 million 
from 2009 to 2012 (Sprrit Airlines, 2013b). The stock 
market also reflected Sprrit's success as the stock pnce, 
wlnch closed mitially at $11.48 followmg the mit1al 
public offenng m May 2011, more than tnpled by 
September of2013. Figure 4 illustrates the dramatic 
turnaround m profits while Figures 5 compare Sprrit's net 
mcome per arrcraft with some of its competitors. 
Spirit Airlines Net Income (In Thousands) 
590,000 
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-$60,000 
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Figure 4. Sprrit Arrlines Net Income - Pnor/Post busmess model change. Adapted from Department of Transportation 
Statistics, Sprrit Arrlines' IPO Prospectus and Form 10-k from the period ending 12/31/12 (Sprrit Arrlines, 201 lb) (Sprrit 
Arrlines, 2013b). 
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Comparison - Net Income per Aircraft (In Thousands) 
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Figure 5. Sptrit Airlines Net Income by Aircraft- Comparison. Adapted from Sptrit Airlines' IPO Prospectus and from 
Sptrit, Southwest Airlines, Amencan Airlines, andJetBlue's Form 10-k. 
Analys1S 
Cost Focus Competitive Advantage 
Followmg its dec1S1on to pursue the ULCC 
busmess model, Spirit sharply narrowed its targeted 
passenger segments to the most pnce sensitive leisure and 
VFR passengers. The timmg of the strategic shift was 
fortuitous as the last decade has seen the distinction between 
economy class on full-service network earners and the 
LCCs blurred as both moved closer to the others product 
offenng. The Great Recession of 2008 drove many 
consumers m search of lower pnces. Busmess traffic 
declined, but VFRand leISure passengers continued to travel 
as airlines chased passengers with reduced fares. Many 
passengers now vtew an economy seat as a commodity with 
the choice of airlines based largely on pnce (Tarry, 2010). 
Sptrit has achieved cost leadership m this narrow 
segment and the resulting financial performance has been 
impressive, especially given the hlstoncally dismal history 
of the U.S. airline mdustry. The busmess model of 
mamtammg very low costs, focusing exclusively on leISure 
and VFR passengers, and the unbundling of services IS 
JAAER, Fall 2013 
umque to the U.S. and has earned Sptrit first mover 
competitive advantages, sunilar to those expenenced by 
Ryan.arr m Europe. The result 1s that Sptrit has been able to 
expand the overall market for arr transport and successfully 
obtamed a competitive advantage through the 
implementation of a cost focus strategy (Porter, 1998). 
Risks 
Porter lists several nsks to companies pursumg 
focus strategies: (a) the ability for other companies to 
imitate the focus strategy, (b) the nsk of the target segment 
becommg structurally unattractive, ( c) the potential for 
broadly targeted competitors to overwhelm the narrow 
segment, or ( d) new entrants takmg a more narrow focus and 
subdivtding the chosen segment (Porter, 1998). 
The nsk of imitation m the short term ts unlikely m 
the U.S. as all other earners, mcluding those still labeled 
LCCs, target busmess clientele who demand more services. 
Allegiant IS an exception, but competition between the two 
1s limited and unlikely to escalate m the short-term as there 
are easier markets to enter than those which would result m 
competition between two pnce-focused earners. The U.S. 
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market 1s mature and fully servtced and there 1s no apparent 
openmg for a new arrline. The nsk of a new entrant 
choosmg a more narrow cost focus strategy and sub-
segmenting Sprrit's target market 1s also unlikely due to the 
already narrow focus on leisure and VFR passengers. 
The nsk of Sprrit's target segment becommg 
structurally unattractive 1s unlikely. Boemg mdicates that 
North Amencan passenger traffic should grow at an annual 
rate of2. 7 percent over the next 20 years and that LCCs are 
currently leading capacity growth (Boemg, 2013). As the 
world economy slowly recovers and the average leisure 
traveler has more disposable mcome, some may abandon 
Sprrit's product for other earners offenng a higher quality 
product and at least some amenities mcluded m the base 
pnce; however, these passengers will likely be replaced with 
those who were previously unable to afford to travel by arr. 
The nsk of more broadly targeted competitors 
overwhelmmg the narrow segment IS also unlikely m the 
short term. Existing earners are heavily mvested m therr 
busmess models, which have also been profitable m recent 
years. While competitors may selectively challenge its 
pncmg on some routes, Sprrit's low frequency m most 
markets doesn't present a senous threat, at least m the short-
term. Recent consolidation of U.S. earners with therr new 
emphasis on financial returns rather than market share also 
works m Sprrit's favor. Over the last several years, the 
maJor network earners and Southwest have restrained 
capacity and focused on higher yield passengers, largely 
abandonmg the extremely pace-sensitive passengers that 
Sprrit targets. Should the largest earners return to an 
emphasis on expanding domestic capacity and growmg 
market share, competition for low-yield passengers would 
mcrease reducmg Sprrit's current competitive advantage. 
One area of potential weakness that may be 
exploited by a potential competitor is Sprrit's level of 
servtce. The accepted wisdom m marketing holds that a firm 
must meet or exceed customer expectations to succeed m a 
competitive marketplace. But Sprrit fails to meet the 
expectations of many passengers. Complamts to the U.S. 
Department ofTransportationhave long been at multiples of 
other arrlines. A search of the web for complamts about 
Sprrit reveals that it has earned the enmity of a host of 
passengers. One website, SprritArrlinesFacts.com (n.d.), 
acknowledges that Sprrit has its fans that "have learned how 
to travel withm Sprrit Arrlines rules, and because of the 
perceived savmgs, they are happy to live with whatever 
mconvemences and mdignities they are exposed to," but 
warns that many others have expenenced rumed vacations 
and destroyed busmess plans. Whether Sprrit can seemmgly 
defy the established marketing wisdom m the long tenn 
remams an open question. 
Sustamability 
Sprrit's financial performance smce completmg the 
transition to the ULCC busmess model has been well above 
the mdustry average. After a disappomting mitial public 
offenng, Sprrit's stock has more than tnpled with analysts 
generally bullish on its prospects (Turcan, 2013) (Jayson, 
2013). Sprrit's target segment of passengers, focused 
pnmarily on pnce, 1s structurally attractive and expecting 
continued growth m the medium term. As the company 
matures employee wages will nse; however, expected 
growth rates should reduce some of the negative pressure as 
new employees JOID the company at the lower wage levels. 
Evaluating the known strategic nsks, Sprrit should not face 
a senous competitive challenge m most markets. As a result, 
Sprrit should dommate the pnce sensitive U.S. arr travel 
market m the short to medium term as it has achieved a 
sustamable competitive advantage based on Porter's cost 
focus strategy (Porter, 1998). + 
James Elian is vice president of operations and a pilot for a North Amencan fractional ownership provider. Mr. Elian received 
his Master ofBusmess Admmistration degree from the Umversity of Calgary and is a Master of Aeronautical Science candidate 
at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Umversity. 
Gerald Cook IS an adjunct professor m the College ofBusmess at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Umversity, Worldwide Campus 
and former arrline operations manager and pilot. Dr. Cook received his Bachelor and Master of Science degrees from Purdue 
Umversity and Doctor ofBusmess Admmtstration from Nova Southeastern Umversity. 
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